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_____ Saturday 20 May 1978 _____ CG NIDC 78/118C _____

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LATE ITEM

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Election

25X1 [REDACTED] //Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer may be preparing to concede defeat to center-left Dominican Revolutionary Party candidate Antonio Guzman. Balaguer's intentions are not certain, however, and he may yet decide to claim victory. Balaguer's stepping down--if the military endorsed it--would ease the immediate threat of violence but would not guarantee an orderly transfer of power.//

25X1 [REDACTED] //Influential opposition leaders and senior election officials have apparently accepted the President's bridling of the military and his subsequent public pledges to honor a fair vote count. A cabinet member, who believes that Guzman won the election, told the US Embassy that Balaguer is ready to hand over power. [REDACTED] 25X1

25X1 [REDACTED] both Balaguer and the armed forces will accept an opposition victory.//

25X1 [REDACTED] Balaguer's intentions, however, are not entirely clear. Although he could concede defeat early based on ruling party tallies that pointed to a Guzman upset before the military intervention on Wednesday, he is more likely to wait for the official count which was probably stacked in his favor during the military takeover. The official count, along with the intrigue at the National Palace, could drag on for days.

25X1 [REDACTED] Balaguer would have great difficulty convincing the military to work with Guzman. The military and the Dominican Revolutionary Party, bitter adversaries in 1965, will not easily shed their mutual hostility to form a government.

25X1 [REDACTED] As the nation's master political broker, Balaguer may be able to negotiate a truce, but it will take great skill to enforce it. Guzman has promised to dump Balaguer's top military officers--veterans of 1965-- [REDACTED] 25X1

National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, 20 May 1978.

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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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USSR-CHINA: Brzezinski's Trip

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[] Pravda's criticism yesterday of National Security Adviser Brzezinski underlines Soviet sensitivity over Brzezinski's trip to Peking. The Soviets are concerned over reports that Brzezinski favors Western arms sales to China and are disturbed that the trip comes at a time of Sino-Soviet polemics over the Soviet intrusion into northeastern China.

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[] Citing western press accounts, Pravda attacked Brzezinski personally rather than commenting directly on the purpose of the Peking mission. The newspaper described him as a veteran anti-Soviet figure who is in a particularly influential position to shape US foreign policy.

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[] The Soviets are especially concerned over US press accounts that Brzezinski was "ready to work out a joint political position with the Chinese." Pravda referred to a recent US journal, which alleged that Brzezinski wants to pursue a more aggressive approach to the Soviet Union and sees special advantage in playing the "China card."

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[] Moscow is presumably troubled by the possibility that the Brzezinski trip will lead to eventual US approval for West European arms sales to China. Pravda asserted that Brzezinski is inclined to go ahead with such sales and would like to see China and the USSR engaged in military confrontation. The presence of a Pentagon official as well as a weapons expert from the National Security Council staff in the Brzezinski delegation may have heightened Moscow's concern in this regard.

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[] The Soviets vehemently oppose any weapons transfers to China, and they have said that they will consider arms sales an unfriendly act toward the USSR. Soviet media have warned the West against collusion with China for anti-Soviet purposes and accentuated the dangers inherent in West European and Japanese arms sales to China.

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[] The timing of the Brzezinski trip is especially unsettling to Moscow because it comes soon after the Soviet Union's unsuccessful efforts to improve ties with China--efforts that, if anything, resulted in a noticeable worsening of

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already troubled relations. The Soviets appear to believe that Peking has no intention of reducing its hostility toward the USSR in the near future and that the Chinese are exploiting the Brzezinski visit to the disadvantage of Moscow.

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NORTH YEMEN: Political Problems

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Few major changes are likely in the new government that will soon be formed in North Yemen, some three weeks after Ahmad al-Ghashmi's election to the presidency. Ghashmi's inability to reconcile the conflicting demands of North Yemen's varied constituencies apparently has been the major reason for the delay in forming a government. A new cabinet is not likely to reduce significantly the many problems facing the Yemeni President.

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The new cabinet will probably be headed by the current prime minister, Abd al-Aziz Abd-al-Ghani, and include expanded representation from the country's unruly northern region. Saudi Arabia and its client, northern tribal chief Abdallah al-Ahmar, apparently have made known the candidates they prefer to lead certain ministries, and the cabinet list is likely to reflect at least partially their preference for conservative ministers.

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In addition to grappling with the formation of a new cabinet, Ghashmi must deal with the problem of former Command Council member and paratroop commander Abdallah al-Alim, who fled from the capital to his home district in Yemen's southern province following his exclusion from the government in late April. Alim has a few hundred armed men with him, but at present he apparently is unable to threaten the government seriously from this remote area.

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Ghashmi is worried that Alim will receive support from the radical South Yemen regime or some other Arab state and organize a viable opposition movement. A forceful move against Alim and his followers could sharpen tensions between the traditionally hostile northern and southern regions of

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North Yemen and might lead South Yemen to intervene on Alim's behalf. Ghashmi hopes to resolve the situation by getting Alim to accept a diplomatic post--the traditional North Yemeni way of compensating the losers in political struggles. [REDACTED]

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NAMIBIA: SWAPO Reaction to Incursion

[REDACTED] //The South-West Africa People's Organization apparently hopes to use the South African incursion into Angola earlier this month to force some changes in the Western proposals on Namibia, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] that organization hopes to capitalize on this. While SWAPO has indicated it is willing to continue talks with the Western five-power contact group, the raid doubtless has convinced many SWAPO leaders that Namibia can be liberated only by a continuing guerrilla struggle.//

[REDACTED] //SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma told the press on his arrival in Luanda last week that the political and diplomatic struggle will continue but that SWAPO is depending on the military struggle to achieve independence for Namibia. Nujoma criticized the Western proposals on several counts and argued that the South Africans intend only to "change the uniforms of the South African soldiers in the territory for the uniforms of the South African police."//

[REDACTED] //The Western proposals call on South Africa to withdraw all but 1,500 of its soldiers from the territory, but no restrictions are placed on the size of the police forces. They would be subject, however, to UN surveillance and allowed to carry only small arms.//

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[REDACTED] //Cuban press reports yesterday quoted Nujoma as saying that SWAPO suspended the talks because the West was involved in the South African raid and that it would be useless to hold a dialogue with those "who attempt to crush the revolutionary struggle of Namibia and South Africa in general." It is unlikely Nujoma would break off the talks until he returned to Lusaka and consulted the national executive committee.//

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ECUADOR: Election Rigging

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[REDACTED] *The recent decision by Ecuador's supreme election tribunal to uphold earlier moves to disqualify candidates contending for the 16 July presidential election had the effect of further aiding government-supported candidates and side-tracking most of those who were not to its liking. Further intervention in the election process cannot be ruled out.*

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[REDACTED] //Despite the insistence by government leaders and even respected former President Galo Plaza that the electoral tribunal acted independently and according to law in ruling on the disqualifications, suspicion is widespread that some military officers are behind the move.//

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[REDACTED] Since February, questionable revisions in the election law and decisions of the electoral tribunal have disqualified as presidential contenders Assad Bucaram, leader of the Concentration of Popular Forces and acknowledged front-runner,

former President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra, former President Carlos Arosemena, radical Liberal candidate Francisco Huerta, and Camilo Mena, candidate of the Maoist Popular Democratic Movement.

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[] Following the Ecuadorean Supreme Court's rejection of an appeal for reinstatement by Francisco Huerta, his radical Liberal Party approved the candidacy of his uncle, Raul Clemente Huerta, who apparently has now become the candidate unofficially favored by the military government. The Liberal Party has been badly split by the elder Huerta's plotting to supplant his nephew, however, and he may not obtain the necessary votes to participate in the runoff election that most likely will be necessary.

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[] Orsvaldo Hurtado, leader of the Popular Democracy Party and vice presidential running mate of Jaime Roldos, Bucaram's surrogate, also was disqualified when the tribunal refused to confer legal status on his party. He circumvented the decision earlier this week, however, by switching his affiliation to the Concentration of Popular Forces, a recognized party.

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[] The electoral tribunal's official inscription on 16 May of the Roldos-Hurtado ticket restores a formidable coalition that could prove a rallying point for those political groups that believe the government is trying to rig the election.

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[] Should Roldos appear likely to defeat Huerta as the runoff candidate of the more numerous center-left constituency, military leaders could again intervene out of fear that Bucaram--who was disqualified in February because of his populist, antimilitary views--would exert a significant influence on the Roldos government. []

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PERU: Election Postponed

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[] Peru's military government, at the request of the National Election Board, has decreed a two-week postponement of the constituent assembly election scheduled for 4 June.

The postponement, which was required because of inadequate preparations at the polls, will give the government more time to deal with public unrest resulting from the imposition of harsh austerity measures last Sunday.

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[] The government's decision appears based on the realization that a poorly administered election would leave it open to charges of voting irregularities and possible fraud. There is no evidence that it is part of a plan to delay the election indefinitely. President Morales Bermudez and other Peruvian leaders had been anxious to hold the balloting as scheduled because of declining public confidence in the military government.

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[] Continuing demonstrations over the steep price hikes on food staples, public transportation, and gasoline undoubtedly contributed to the decision to delay.

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[] The protests, which began on Monday, have been confined primarily to outlying cities, but they have been violent and several have resulted in fatalities. Troops continue to patrol the streets of a half dozen provincial urban centers.

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[] The military views these demonstrations as merely a first wave. It is likely that the protests will turn even more violent and disruptive once consumers begin to feel the full impact of the new economic measures.

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
[] Public reaction has been almost entirely spontaneous. The acid test for the government could come on Monday and Tuesday, when trade unions are organizing a nationwide work stoppage. The strike appears to have the same broad support as one last July that paralyzed Lima for 24 hours and helped break the government's resolve to implement less severe austerity measures than those just enacted.

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[] At present, the top military leadership seems united in its determination to enforce austerity as a means to extricate Peru from its worst economic crisis of this century. Among middle-grade officers and below, however, there are rumblings of discontent and considerable sympathy with the financially

hard-pressed populace. Divided loyalties among the lower ranks could create problems should the government feel obliged to employ strong repressive tactics. [REDACTED]

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SPAIN: By-Election Results

The Socialists and the Communists both made gains in by-elections held in Spain earlier this week. The results will not affect the ruling Democratic Center's strong majority in the Senate, however, and are unlikely to have much impact on the political situation in Spain.

The elections took place in Alicante on the southern coast of Spain, and in the northern mining district of Asturias. Both are leftist strongholds, and the Socialists were heavily favored to sweep the board. The turnout was low--about 50 percent in both provinces.

All four major parties claim to be satisfied with the results:

- The Socialists won, although their percent of the vote--35 and 33 percent respectively--was substantially down from the parliamentary election last summer.
- The Democratic Center was pleased that its share of the vote dropped less overall than that of the Socialists.
- The Communist Party almost doubled its share of the vote, winning 16 percent in Alicante and 23 percent in Asturias, where they almost caught up with the Democratic Center.

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-- The rightists Popular Alliance improved slightly on its 1977 showing.

25X1 [] Although the strong Communist performance has stirred up a great deal of press comment in Spain, it is unlikely to reflect a similar upsurge in the party's national strength. The low turnout probably favored the Communists, as did specific local conditions--especially in Asturias, which is reasserting its traditional leftist identity. []

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BRIEFS

Afghanistan

25X1 [] During a stopover Thursday in Moscow, Afghan Foreign Minister Amin met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko; it was the first official foreign visit of a member of the new Afghan regime. According to the official communique, the discussion was "warm and heartfelt" with each side pledging to expand and strengthen bilateral ties. The communique also specifically mentioned the new Afghan Government's commitment to nonalignment and its determination to make an active contribution to the reduction of tensions in Asia.

25X1 [] Earlier this week, the Soviets and Afghans signed four economic aid contracts that had been negotiated before last month's coup. Gromyko and Amin apparently discussed continued Soviet aid to Afghanistan. Amin was scheduled to arrive in Cuba yesterday for a meeting of the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau. From Cuba he will go to New York for the beginning of the UN Special Session on Disarmament on Tuesday. []

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USSR-Czechoslovakia

25X1 [] Soviet President Brezhnev plans to visit Prague in late May or early June, []

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25X1 [] The visit may be intended to underscore Moscow's support for party leader Husak in the 10th anniversary year of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev's trip lends credence to earlier rumors that party and government leaders from the Warsaw Pact countries will meet in Prague in early June. This would be the first Warsaw Pact summit meeting since November 1976. []

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South Korea

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[redacted] The South Korean Government is pleased with the high turnout--78.8 percent--in Thursday's vote for members of the nonpartisan electoral college. Although a strong campaign to raise the vote was launched at the last minute, the election atmosphere was apparently the most relaxed in South Korea's postwar history. The 2,583 electors chosen this week will in turn select the president--almost certainly Pak Chong-hui--sometime between July and November. [redacted]

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International

25X1 [] //Jamaican Prime Minister Manley apparently has called off the summit of world leaders, scheduled for late May, that was to discuss North-South economic issues. Although it is possible that Manley will seek an alternate date, this seems unlikely and Jamaican Embassies in the countries already invited have been informed.//

25X1 [] //The decision by West German Chancellor Schmidt not to attend the conference and the evident feeling by Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada that the conference was ill-timed contributed to Manley's belief that the meeting would not be successful. []

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